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Note
Marchica v. Long Island Railroad: "AIDS-
Phobia" Recovery Under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act
I. Introduction
The pandemic spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome ("AIDS")' throughout the United States, and society's
growing concern for its deadly consequences, 2 have contributed
to a diverse amount of AIDS-related litigation finding its way
into the courts today.3 In the case of Marchica v. Long Island
1. AIDS is a fatal disease that destroys the body's natural immunity defense
system, thus rendering it incapable of fighting off certain life-threatening infec-
tions and malignancies. See ABA AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AIDS THE
LEGAL ISSUES: DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AIDS COOR-
DINATING COMMITTEE 8 (1988). The retrovirus which causes AIDS, commonly
known as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), can be acquired through
infected blood, semen, vaginal fluids, or perinatally through the womb of an in-
fected mother. Id. at 10-11. The recipient of the HIV virus, however, does not
develop the AIDS disease immediately upon infection. See Mathilde Krim, Preface
to the Second Edition of LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., AIDS
LEGAL GUIDE at p-1 (Abbey R. Rubenfeld ed., 2d ed. 1987). Instead, the virus may
lie dormant for some time, or else enter a latent incubation period in which the
immune system gradually breaks down over the course of several years. Id. Tech-
nically, the AIDS disease develops only after one or more of several opportunistic
"indicator" diseases manifests itself in the body. Id.
2. See Marsha F. Goldsmith, Physicians at AMA Amsterdam News Seminar
Offer Panoramic View of their Varied Roles in Pandemic (AIDS Pandemic), 268
JAMA 1237, 1245 (1992). Current statistics estimate that approximately one mil-
lion individuals in the United States alone are infected with the HIV virus. Id. at
1245. Since HIV is most commonly transmitted through intimate sexual contact
and injectional drug use, two activities involving very strong "human drives," the
disease has been virtually impossible to stop. Id. at 1246.
3. See John Patrick Darby, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS
Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
185, 187-88 & nn.5-7 (1988) (recognizing the various causes of action and theories
of liability that AIDS-related litigation may encompass).
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Railroad,4 a federal district court had to determine for the first
time whether a railroad-employer could be liable under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act ("FELA) for the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress upon an employee who had suffered
from the fear of contracting AIDS (also referred to as "AIDS-
phobia").6 The employee developed AIDS-phobia after pricking
himself with a discarded hypodermic needle that he acciden-
tally picked up while working in an area of a railroad station
frequented by drug addicts, prostitutes, and homeless people. 7
He alleged that the railroad was negligent in failing to maintain
his workplace in a reasonably safe condition, and that this neg-
ligence was the cause of his resulting physical and psychological
injuries.8 Because this was a case of first impression for the fed-
eral courts, the Eastern District of New York was unable to
seek direct guidance from any of the circuits. However, after
analyzing the liberal standards intended to govern FELA negli-
gence actions,9 and after examining recent state law develop-
ments in the area of AIDS-phobia recovery, 0 the court
sustained this cause of action and denied the employer's motion
for summary judgment."' It concluded that "FELA [did] encom-
pass a cause of action for fear of contracting the AIDS virus
where the basis of the claim [was] a documented physical injury
sustained by the plaintiff," despite the absence of actual expo-
sure to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). 12 The case
then proceeded to trial where a jury found the railroad company
4. 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995).
5. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 446.
7. Id. at 446.
8. Id. at 447.
9. Id. at 449-51.
10. Id. at 451-53.
11. Id. at 453.
12. Id. at 449, 453. HIV is the causative virus that produces the AIDS dis-
ease. See Krim, supra note 1, at p-1. It can be transmitted through bodily fluids
during intimate sexual activity, through contaminated hypodermic needles during
injectional drug use, from mother to infant during pregnancy and through infected
blood transfusions. Id. The HIV virus impairs a person's natural defense system
by specifically attacking the body's supply of disease-fighting, T-lymphocyte white
blood cells. See ABA AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 10. Once
enough of these T-lymphocyte cells are destroyed, the body becomes "immu-
noincompetent" and can no longer fight off the opportunistic infections and cancers
that develop into full-blown AIDS. Id. at 10, 12.
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partially liable and awarded the plaintiff compensation for his
past pain and emotional distress, as well as for his future
damages.' 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment and determined that recovery for the emotional dis-
tress injuries fell within the permissive scope of FELA.14 In do-
ing so, it ruled that "a FELA plaintiff who has suffered a
physical impact may recover for a fear of developing AIDS if the
impact caused by the defendant's negligence occurred under cir-
cumstances that would cause a reasonable person to develop a
fear of AIDS."15 Even though the plaintiff could not prove ac-
tual exposure to the HIV virus, the Second Circuit agreed that
the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's needle-prick in-
jury rendered his AIDS-phobia claim cognizable under FELA.16
In this Note, Part II.A and II.B examine the general provi-
sions and scope of FELA in order to demonstrate that claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, based upon the fear of
contracting a serious disease, are cognizable under the statute.
Part II.C.1 then focuses on the discrepancy which existed
within the federal circuits at the time this case went to trial
concerning the appropriate requirements needed to sustain a
FELA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. How-
ever, in light of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,17 a case that was decided pending
the railroad's appeal, this issue was resolved by the time
Marchica reached the Second Circuit.' 8 Part II.C.2 discusses
the Supreme Court's decision in Gottshall, and its newly-articu-
lated standard for emotional distress recovery under the
statute.
13. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1201 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995). The jury initially awarded the plaintiff $225,000 for
his "past pain, suffering and emotional distress" and an additional $55,000 for his
"future damages." Id. However, since the railroad was found to be only 45 percent
culpable, the judgment against it was reduced to $126,000. Id.
14. Id. at 1200.
15. Id. at 1206.
16. Id.
17. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
18. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1203 (deferring to the common law standard set
forth in Gottshall).
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Part II.D then examines non-FELA, common law develop-
ments in the AIDS-phobia arena. This section will investigate
how the issue of AIDS-phobia has been addressed in various
state courts, and it will also highlight two conflicting standards
for recovery that have been adopted in different jurisdictions.
Next, Part III will detail the facts of Marchica and discuss the
Second Circuit's affirmance of the lower court's judgment. Part
IV will then analyze the issue of FELA recovery for AIDS-pho-
bia in order to show that the circuit decision was correct, and
that certain emotional distress injury may be compensable
under FELA in similar situations. This section supports the
Second Circuit's finding that proof of actual exposure to the HIV
virus is not a mandatory requirement for AIDS-phobia recovery
in a needle-prick situation, despite several non-FELA cases that
have been decided otherwise.' 9
Finally, in light of the massive AIDS awareness campaign
being waged in the media today, Part V concludes that a physi-
cally traumatic injury such as a needle prick may be enough to
support a valid AIDS-phobia claim, in both FELA and non-
FELA situations alike, for injuries that develop within a reason-
able time period.
II. Background
A. The Federal Employers' Liability Act
Employers have always had a duty at common law to use
reasonable care in providing their employees with a safe work-
ing environment.20 Congress eventually recognized the impor-
tance of this duty as it applied to the railroad industry, and it
codified the specific provisions of FELA.21 The first section of
FELA states that:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several States... shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce ... for such injury or death resulting in whole
19. See discussion infra part II.D.1.
20. See Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943) (referring to the
well-established duty that exists in the master-servant relationship); see also 3
LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT § 917 (2d ed. 1913).
21. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
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or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier .... *22
This provision contains four requirements that a plaintiff must
satisfy before he can recover under the statute.23 First, there
must be some type of injury suffered by the plaintiff.24 Second,
the plaintiff's work must have been related to interstate com-
mercial transport. 25 Third, there must be proof of the em-
ployer's negligence. 26 Finally, the employer's negligence "must
have played a role in the injury."27 This Note focuses on the
first "injury" requirement in order to decide whether the plain-
tiff's emotional distress was actionable under FELA.
B. Scope of FELA
When FELA was enacted in 1906, Congress's main objec-
tive was "to provide a federal remedy for railroad workers who
suffer[ed] personal injuries as a result of the negligence of their
employer or their fellow employees."28 Congress acknowledged
that railroad workers had special needs because they were reg-
ularly exposed to great risks in the workplace, and often were
unable to provide for their own safety.29 Thus, the statute was
designed to facilitate recovery for meritorious claims, and to
eliminate some of the traditional tort defenses that have been
available to employers.30 Essentially, Congress realized that
22. Id. § 51.
23. See Halko v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 677 F. Supp. 135, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987).
29. Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958) (citing Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943)).
30. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 366-67 (3d Cir.
1993) (describing various deficiencies in the common law tort principles which
FELA corrected by eliminating traditional impediments to recovery). For example,
under §§ 53 and 54, FELA respectively limits a railroad's use of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk as defenses. Id. at 367. Also, § 60 prohibits an em-
ployer from firing an otherwise "at-will" employee for merely offering information
about a FELA controversy, or pursuing his own FELA claim. Id. Furthermore,
§ 55 prevents carriers covered by this statute from contracting away their FELA
liability or limiting it pursuant to any regulation. Id. Any such agreement will be
treated as void by the courts.
1995] 579
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railroad workers often lacked the resources and economic bar-
gaining power needed to protect their interests, and therefore
determined that the cost on "human overhead" should be artifi-
cially shifted to the railroads who could better bear this
burden.31
FELA is not, however, a workmen's compensation statute.3 2
Evidence of the employer's negligence is still a prerequisite for
recovery, just as in any other negligence action.33 Nevertheless,
the federal courts have consistently interpreted the statute in a
broad manner by departing from common law negligence rules
and applying very liberal constructions. 34 Moreover, the lan-
guage of the statute is purposefully expansive. 35 The statute
does not attempt to define negligence, but instead leaves that
up to the courts.36 Also, there are no restrictions on the types of
railroad employees that are covered, the causes of injury that
are actionable (except that they must involve the employer's
negligent conduct), or the particular types of injuries that are
compensable. 37
When Congress originally enacted the statute, its primary
focus was upon "'injuries and death resulting from accidents on
interstate railroads ... [since] . . . these were the major causes
of injury and death resulting from railroad operations.' 3 8 How-
ever, neither the language of the statute, nor legislative history
31. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (stating that FELA "was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the
cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations."); Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943).
32. Ellis v. Union Pac. Ry., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947).
33. Id. Accord, Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949).
34. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957) (re-
jecting the stricter common law causation requirements, and instead ruling that
"whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence
played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury" is the standard to
determine if a FELA action proceeds to a jury); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Melcher,
333 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1964) (determining that "under [FELA], the right of the
jury to pass upon the question of fault and causality must be most liberally
viewed."); Lancaster v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 773 F.2d 807, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987) (applying FELA to cover an intentional tort situa-
tion, even though it is technically a negligence statute).
35. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 (1949).
36. Yawn v. Southern Ry., 591 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
934 (1979).
37. See 45 U.S.C. § 51.
38. Yawn, 591 F.2d at 315 (quoting Urie, 337 U.S. at 181).
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indicates any Congressional intent to preclude certain inju-
ries.3 9 The only express limitation is that injuries must result
"'in whole or in part from the negligence' of the carrier."40
Therefore, reading any unexpressed limitations into this stat-
ute would be contrary to "the wording, the remedial and hu-
manitarian purpose, and the constant and established course of
liberal construction of the Act .... "41
Due to FELA's broad language and remedial nature, the
Supreme Court has confirmed that FELA should be interpreted
and applied liberally in accordance with Congressional intent.42
As a result, courts have sustained claims for non-traditional
types of railroad injuries in addition to those that are more com-
monplace in the industry.43
With the development of the common law tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress over the years,44 the federal
courts have been faced with deciding what types of emotional
distress injuries are compensable under FELA, and in what sit-
uations they may be recovered. Until very recently, there was
no Supreme Court decision that provided any definitive gui-
dance on this matter.45 This produced an inconsistency among
the circuits respecting the requirements needed to sustain an
emotional distress claim under the statute. 46 In the case of
39. Urie, 337 U.S. at 181.
40. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51).
41. Id. at 181-82.
42. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1987); Urie, 337 U.S. at 180-82; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930).
43. See, e.g., Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 372 U.S. 248, 249 (1963) (recog-
nizing a cause of action under FELA for injuries sustained from an intentional
assault by another railroad employee); Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62
(1947) (recognizing a cause of action under FELA for injuries sustained from an
intentional assault by a non-employee); Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80,
82-85 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing a FELA claim for "non-traditional" types of injury
where a railroad employee was bitten by a dog on railroad property); Hartel v.
Long Island R.R., 476 F.2d 462, 464-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973)
(recognizing a FELA action where a railroad ticket agent was shot and killed dur-
ing a hold-up).
44. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 54, at 359-66 (5th ed. 1984).
45. As of June 24, 1994, federal courts now have a standard to follow. See
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
46. See infra part II.C.1 (discussing the conflict between the circuits over the
proper standard needed to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress in a FELA action).
1995]
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Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway v. Buell,47 the Supreme
Court had previously declined an opportunity to articulate a
uniform rule. The employee in that case had filed a FELA ac-
tion against the railroad, alleging that the railroad was negli-
gent in providing him with a safe workplace because it
condoned the conduct of other employees who harassed,
threatened and intimidated him on the job.48 The employee as-
serted that this negligence caused him to suffer an emotional
breakdown. 49 The Ninth Circuit upheld the employee's claim
and concluded that pure emotional injury was compensable
under FELA.0 Upon review, the Supreme Court refrained from
taking a definitive stance on this issue, and simply stated in
dicta that whether emotional injury was compensable under
FELA was not subject to a "yes" or "no" answer. 51 Instead, it
would be necessary to look at the circumstances of each case,
such as the nature of the injury or the character of tortious ac-
tivity involved, in order to make such fact-specific determina-
tions.52 The Court concluded that "FELA jurisprudence gleans
guidance from common law developments," and that "broad pro-
nouncements in this area may have to bow to precise applica-
tion of developing legal principles to the particular facts at
hand."53 Accordingly, the federal courts were forced to look to
common law developments in their respective jurisdictions for
guidance on this issue.
C. Common Law Limitations to Emotional Distress Recovery
In most states, general non-FELA claims for emotional dis-
tress have been recognized in some form or another under com-
mon law.5 4 However, courts have exercised caution in this area
47. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
48. Id. at 559.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 561. The district court granted the railroad's summary judgment
motion because it believed that the Railway Labor Act, and not FELA, provided
the exclusive resolution for labor disputes in the railroad industry. Id. at 560.
"[Alithough the question had neither been raised by the parties nor addressed by
the District Court.. .," the Ninth Circuit still decided to express its opinion on this
issue. Id. at 560-61 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 570.
52. Id. at 568.
53. Id. at 568, 570.
54. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 359-61.
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so as to avoid certain undesirable results.55 Their primary con-
cerns have been focused on: (1) preventing legal redress for
harm that is temporary and trivial; (2) avoiding an increased
number of falsified claims that may be pursued by dishonest lit-
igants; and (3) minimizing disproportionately unfair financial
burdens that would be imposed upon negligent defendants for
remote and tenuous consequences resulting from their alleged
wrongful conduct.56 As a result, several different standards
that evolved from the common law were also adopted to some
extent by the various circuits. 57 These standards all differed
with respect to the degree of physical symptomology that a
plaintiff had to demonstrate in order to substantiate an emo-
tional distress claim.58
55. Id. at 360-61.
56. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); Pay-
ton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-81 (Mass. 1982).
57. See infra part II.C.1.
58. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 362-65 (detailing the various
common law requirements that have developed for emotional distress recovery).
Professor Keeton points out that courts generally require emotional injury to be
accompanied by some form of physical harm or symptomology. Id. Originally, a
physical "impact" or "contact" injury test was the standard adopted by most courts.
Id. at 363-64. Under this approach, recovery for emotional injury was denied un-
less the plaintiff could show that it arose from some type of physical impact or
contact. Id. The theory behind this rule was that it allegedly guaranteed the gen-
uineness of the emotional injury claim. Id. However, most jurisdictions have
abandoned that rigid requirement today, since it fails to provide a fair and accu-
rate guideline in many situations. Id. at 364. Evolving out of the physical impact
test is the "zone of danger" test. Id. at 365. This broadens the impact test a bit by
allowing recovery not only for those who sustain a physical impact, but also for
those who are threatened with immediate physical harm because of their location
within a "zone of danger." See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Neg-
ligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules,
34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 488-90 (1982). The theory behind this rule is that "a near
miss may be as frightening as a direct hit." Id. at 488. Currently, fourteen juris-
dictions follow a zone of danger test. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114
S. Ct. 2396, 2406 (1994). Another standard, first articulated in a 1968 California
case, is the "relative bystander" test. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 920
(Cal. 1968). This test, which is followed in almost half of the states, allows for
bystanders who are outside of the zone of danger to recover for emotional distress
in situations where such injury is "brought on by witnessing the injury or death of
a third party (who typically must be a close relative of the bystander)." Gottshall,
114 S. Ct. at 2407. Still another test adopted by many jurisdictions today is the
physical "manifestation" test. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 364. In
order for a plaintiff to recover, this test requires the emotional distress to "mani-
fest" itself in some physical form that qualifies as a requisite "injury, illness, or...
consequence." Id. Note that many courts applying a zone of danger or relative
9
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1. Prior Discrepancy Within the Circuits
The requirements needed to sustain FELA claims for emo-
tional distress injuries varied among the circuits depending
upon which common law standard they applied. For example,
at least one of the circuits adhered to a strict physical "impact"
or "contact" requirement. 59 In Bullard v. Central Vermont Rail-
way,60 the First Circuit upheld this standard when it reduced a
plaintiff's generous jury award for emotional distress dam-
ages.61 There, a railroad employee sought recovery for his al-
leged emotional distress injuries after surviving a freight train
collision.62 In addition to injuring his foot, the employee also
claimed mental anguish because "his job require[d] him to pass
the accident site nearly every day and ... he expect[ed] to see
the deceased members of [his] crew waiting for him as he
pass[ed]." 63 Although a jury awarded the employee $35,000 in
total damages, the First Circuit found this amount to be
"grossly excessive" because it was above and beyond any
amount properly attributable to his minor foot injury.64 The
court ultimately concluded that only mental suffering resulting
from a precipitating physical injury was compensable under
FELA.65 Thus, he could recover for limited mental distress aris-
ing from the actual accident for which there was competent evi-
dence.66 However, he could not be compensated for "his sadness
at the passing of his friends," nor his alleged mental or nervous
after-effects in the absence of any "probative evidence of com-
bystander test will also require a showing of some physical manifestation. See
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2407 n.l1. Finally, a few courts have gone one step further
by completely abandoning these judicially created tests. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 44, § 54, at 364-65. These courts look merely to the seriousness and reasona-
bleness of the alleged emotional distress on a case-by-case basis to determine if it
may be genuine. Id. at 365 & n.60. See also Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of Disease
and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 527, 531 (1984) (discussing the recent trends in requirements for negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims in toxic tort cases).
59. See supra note 58 (describing and distinguishing the different tests).
60. 565 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1977).
61. Id. at 197-98.
62. Id. at 195-96.
63. Id. at 196.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 197.
66. Id.
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pensable psychological or neurological effects enduring beyond
the day of the accident."67
This decision was later relied upon by the First Circuit in
Moody v. Maine Central Railroad68 to support a district court's
firm holding that "there [could] be no recovery for emotional dis-
turbance under the FELA" unless it was the necessary or natu-
ral consequence of "some precipitating physical injury."69 In
that case, a railroad employee claimed that he was negligently
injured by the railroad due to the long and continued psycholog-
ical abuse he encountered at work.70 He alleged that this abuse
caused him to experience fatigue and depression, and to suffer
angina attacks.7' The First Circuit denied the plaintiff's recov-
ery and agreed with the district court's finding that even if the
depression, fatigue and angina attacks were enough to consti-
tute a physical injury resulting from the plaintiff's mental dis-
turbance, "it would be a consequence of the mental disturbance
and would not constitute the requisite precipitating physical in-
jury."72 However, the circuit court did admit that its position in
Bullard might be questionable due to the Supreme Court's sub-
sequent decision in Buell.7 3 It acknowledged that Buell "at-
tempt[s] to leave the door to recovery for wholly emotional
injury somewhat ajar but not by any means wide open."74
The "zone of danger" test,75 which is an extension of the im-
pact test, had seemingly been espoused by another circuit. In
Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Railway,76 a case decided
before the Supreme Court's decision in Buell, the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted this requirement when affirming the plaintiff's
claim for emotional distress. 77 In that case, a railroad employee
67. Id.
68. 620 F. Supp. 1472, 1473 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1473.
70. Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693, 693 (1st Cir. 1987).
71. Id.
72. Moody, 620 F. Supp. at 1474.
73. Moody, 823 F.2d at 694.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 58. This test is usually applied in conjunction with a physi-
cal manifestation requirement.
76. 773 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
77. Id. at 813, 823.
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developed paranoid schizophrenia78 and alleged that his mental
condition was instigated by the improper and abusive treat-
ment he received from his supervisors.7 9 Among other things,
he claimed that they hit and threatened him, and touched his
body in an offensive manner.80 Although the complaint was
based on an allegation of intent (rather than negligence), the
court broadly pronounced that FELA would not create a cause
of action for any tortious injuries which lacked physical contact
or threat of physical contact.8' Accordingly, this requirement
was satisfied because of the physical nature of the supervisor's
conduct.8 2
Subsequently, in Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,83 the Sev-
enth Circuit reaffirmed this position.8 4 There, a plaintiff alleged
that the verbal threats, harassment and intimidation he re-
ceived from his superior resulted in his nervous breakdown.8 5
However, the plaintiff did not allege any physical contact, or
threat of physical contact, from the negligent conduct.8 Rely-
ing on its prior decision in Lancaster, the Seventh Circuit dis-
missed the emotional distress claim.8 7 It also noted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Buell did not require a different
result because the issue of wholly emotional distress recovery
under FELA was not directly resolved in that case.88
Several of the circuit and district courts, following a recent
common law trend, rejected strict adherence to the physical im-
pact rule by allowing recovery for emotional injury when it was
accompanied by some manifestation of physical injury.8 9 For
example, in Adkins v. Seaboard System Railroad,90 the Sixth
78. Paranoid schizophrenia is a type of "psychosis," or mental disorder, evi-
denced primarily by delusions of persecution and a morbid over-evaluation of one-
self. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY: FIFTH UNABRIDGED LAWYER'S EDITION 1261
(5th ed. 1982).
79. Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 810-11.
80. Id. at 811.
81. Id. at 813.
82. Id. at 815.
83. 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 (1992).
84. Id. at 705.
85. Id. at 704.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 58.
90. 821 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
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Circuit dismissed a plaintiff's claim for emotional distress re-
covery because he failed to allege any resulting physical in-
jury.91 The plaintiff in that case, a former railroad employee,
claimed that certain railroad employees "deliberately ... con-
spired to have [him] terminated... culminating in him suffer-
ing great emotional distress and physical pain as a result of
these actions."92 Although the case involved intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court decided that claims for
"pure emotional injury [were] not cognizable under FELA."93
Therefore, recovery was denied because of the employee's fail-
ure to allege a manifestation of any specific physical injury aris-
ing out of the emotional distress.94
Similarly, in Halko v. New Jersey Transit Rail Opera-
tions,95 the Southern District of New York noted that most juris-
dictions rejected the stricter impact rule, and instead required
that "'the mental distress be certified by some physical injury,
illness, or other objective physical manifestation.' ,,96 The plain-
tiff in that case was a widow who brought a FELA action on
behalf of her deceased husband. She alleged that his suicide
resulted from the tormenting he received at work by supervi-
sors, and that the railroad was negligent in hiring and supervis-
ing its managerial staff.97 The court held that the suicide, albeit
a delayed result, was definitely a sufficient physical manifesta-
tion to satisfy the requirement. 98
Another district court opinion which analyzed and upheld a
physical manifestation rule was Amendola v. Kansas City
Southern Railway.99 The plaintiffs in that case brought a FELA
action against the railroad to recover for their fear of con-
tracting asbestosis'00 or asbestosis-related cancers.10 1 The court
agreed that FELA could potentially support claims for negligent
91. Id. at 342.
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id. at 342.
94. Id.
95. 677 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
96. Id. at 139 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 360-61).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
100. Asbestosis is the inflammation and fibrosis of the lungs caused by the
inhalation of tiny asbestos particles. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY: FIFTH
UNABRIDGED LAWYER'S EDITION 128 (5th ed. 1982). Asbestos, a fibrous compound
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infliction of emotional distress in the form of cancer-phobia. 0 2
However, the plaintiffs' particular cause of action failed because
the complaint did not allege any physical harm caused either by
the fear of contracting the disease, or by the asbestos itself.0 3
The court applied what it considered to be the moderate and
fair rule established by the Massachusetts court in Payton v.
Abbott Labs. 0 4 That rule required a plaintiff to show some type
of physical harm that either caused the emotional distress, or
alternatively, was caused by the emotional distress, before re-
covery would be permitted. 05 The court in Amendola reasoned
that such a test provided an equitable safeguard against false
claims and frivolous suits, while still allowing recovery for cases
involving valid emotional injuries. 06 Although the court recog-
nized that some meritorious claims might be precluded under
this standard, it agreed with Payton's unwillingness to "impose
upon the judicial system and potential defendants the burden of
dealing with [emotional distress] claims . . . that are trivial,
evanescent, temporary, feigned, or imagined" for the sake of
those few exceptions. 0 7
The Western District of New York also upheld a physical
manifestation requirement in Reese v. CSX Transportation.0
There, an inexperienced employee was transferred to a stressful
job assignment as a track switchman in charge of overseeing
numerous sets of railroad tracks. 10 9 After approximately one
week in this new position, the employee experienced anxieties
and depression stemming from his fear of causing a fatal acci-
composed of calcium and magnesium silicates, is commonly used in insulation and
fireproofing materials. Id.
101. Amendola, 699 F. Supp. at 1402-03. Two such asbestos-related cancers
are "pleural mesothelioma" (a malignant tissue growth that forms in the membra-
nous lining of the lungs) and "bronchial carcinoma" (a malignant tissue growth
that forms in the bronchial tubes). See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcTIONARY: FIFTH
UNABRIDGED LAWYER'S EDITION 196, 223, 861, 1100 (5th ed. 1982).
102. Amendola, 699 F. Supp. at 1408.
103. Id. at 1411.
104. 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982) (requiring a showing of some physical
harm that either "precipitated" the emotional distress, or else "arose out of" the
emotional distress).
105. Id. at 181.
106. Amendola, 699 F. Supp. at 1410-11.
107. Id. at 1410 (quoting Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 180).
108. No. 90-CV-344E, 1992 WL 119163 (W.D.N.Y. May 22, 1992).
109. Id. at *1-*2.
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dent due to improper training."0 He subsequently had a stroke
that resulted directly from this emotional injury and anxiety."'
The court rejected the railroad's motion to dismiss the em-
ployee's claim for his failure to satisfy the physical contact stan-
dard." 2 Instead, it followed the Halko decision, and only
required a showing of some physical manifestation due to the
emotional injury." 3 In doing so, the court reasoned that the
stroke was a sufficient physical injury to sustain the cause of
action. 114
Finally, three circuits concluded, or at least acknowledged,
that claims for pure emotional injury under FELA were com-
pensable even without satisfying any common law physical
symptomology test. In Taylor v. Burlington Northern Rail-
road,115 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position in Buell, and
stated that the law of the circuit allowed railroad employees to
assert claims under FELA for wholly emotional injury." 6 The
plaintiff in Taylor sought to recover damages for his paranoid
schizophrenia, which allegedly resulted from managerial har-
assment on the job." 7 Although the complaint was ambiguous
as to any allegations of physical contact or physical manifesta-
tions, the court sustained his claim." 8 It reasoned that its own
decision in Buell was binding, despite the Seventh Circuit's con-
trary position in Lancaster.n 9
Cases involving FELA's companion statute, the Jones
Act, 120 have also provided some relevant insight into this area.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *1, *3.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. However, the court did not address the issue of whether "wholly emo-
tional injury," without more, was cognizable under FELA. Id. at *4 n.6.
115. 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1313.
117. Id. at 1312.
118. Id. at 1313.
119. Id. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
120. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988). The Jones Act, which governs employers'
negligence in maritime cases, incorporates FELA by reference, and extends the
same liberal remedies and liability standards to seamen as FELA does to railroad
workers. See Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 72 (D.
Mass. 1993). The negligence concepts are essentially identical under both stat-
utes. Id. at 73. Thus, courts are able to look to both Jones Act and FELA cases for
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In Hagerty v. L.& L. Marine Services,121 the Fifth Circuit sus-
tained a cause of action for the fear of contracting cancer. 122
The plaintiff, a Jones Act seaman, was accidentally doused with
a carcinogenic chemical while working. 23 Despite his satisfac-
tion of both the physical impact and manifestation require-
ments, the court criticized such tests as being unrealistic
standards for recovery. 24 Although each is supposed to "pro-
vide courts with an objective means of ensuring that the alleged
mental injury is not feigned," 25 it reasoned that these arbitrary
tests did not prove any more reliable in the fact-finder's deter-
mination process.126 Instead, the Fifth Circuit adopted a rea-
sonableness standard that did not demand a physical
symptomology prerequisite. 127 Accordingly, the court placed
emphasis on the plaintiff's prior knowledge that dripolene was
a carcinogen. 28 Because he realized that benzene had been ab-
sorbed into his body as a result of the drenching, and because
his doctor advised him to undergo periodic testing for cancer,
the particular facts presented "sufficient indicia of genuineness"
to allow his cancer-phobia claim to proceed to the jury.29
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also acknowledged
the possibility of recovering for pure emotional injuries under
FELA in Carroll v. Consolidated Rail.30 In that case, an assis-
tant railroad dispatcher alleged that the depression, paranoia,
anxiety, and functional impairments he suffered were a direct
guidance when examining negligent infliction of emotional distress issues in either
setting. Id.
121. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 317, 319.
123. Id. at 317. The chemical involved in this accident was "dripolene," a com-
pound containing benzene. Id. Benzene is a toxic substance which the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration has listed as a potential cancer-causing
agent. 2 McGRAw-HILL' ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 467 (6th ed.
1987).
124. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 318.
125. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 54, at 330-33 (4th ed. 1971)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 318-19.
129. Id. at 319.
130. No. Civ.A.89-4650, 1991 WL 32859 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1991), aff'd, 941
F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 916 (1992).
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result of his chaotic and stressful working environment.131
Eventually, the employee was forced to quit work because of his
"emotionally impoverished state," and claimed that his injuries
were caused by the railroad's unsafe and inadequate working
conditions. 13 2 The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's
claim because his alleged injuries arose merely out of the ordi-
nary stress inherent in office management, rather than from
any excessive dangers in the workplace. 33 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court adopted the Third Circuit's approach as set forth
in Holliday v. Consolidated Rail.'34 The Third Circuit in Hol-
liday also rejected an employee's claim for stress-related inju-
ries caused by unpleasant working conditions, but stated in
dicta that "[w]e are not holding that there can never be a recov-
ery under the FELA for emotional conditions unless the em-
ployee suffers an immediate physical injury ... or unless there
is at least an accident of some kind ... ."35 Thus, the Third
Circuit acknowledged the potential for emotional distress recov-
ery without any physical symptomology requirements by con-
cluding that such determinations should be made on a fact-
specific basis, rather than by applying any bright-line rules.136
Three years later, this very same liberal reasoning was
used by the Third Circuit in Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail137 to
completely reject all of the common law limitations placed on
FELA emotional distress recovery. 13 Consequently, this deci-
sion forced the Supreme Court to take a closer look at the issue
and articulate a uniform federal standard.
2. The New FELA Standard
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,139 decided just one
month before the Second Circuit's review of Marchica, the
131. Id. at *1-*3.
132. Id. at *1, *3.
133. Id. at *3.
134. 914 F.2d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090 (1991).
135. Id. at 426-27.
136. Id. at 427.
137. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
138. Id. at 370-71.
139. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). The Supreme Court actually consolidated and
reviewed two separate Third Circuit decisions on this FELA issue: Gottshall v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993) and Carlisle v. Consolidated
1995]
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Supreme Court finally determined the "proper" standard to be
applied when evaluating claims for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress brought under FELA.140 The respondent in that
case ("Gottshall") had been a member of a Conrail work crew
that was assigned to replace some defective railroad tracks on a
hot summer day.' 4 ' Because they were working under time con-
straints, the crew was discouraged from resting or taking any
breaks. 42 Shortly into their workday, one of the crew members,
a long-time friend of Gottshall, suffered a heart attack in front
of Gottshall and the other men. 43 Gottshall immediately at-
tempted to resuscitate his friend while the crew supervisor
went to get assistance. 44 However, by the time paramedics ar-
rived at the scene, his friend had died.145 The crew supervisor
then ordered all of the men back to work within sight of the
decedent's body. 1' Although the body had been covered with a
sheet by the paramedics, they had directed that it remain un-
disturbed until a coroner's examination several hours later. 47
As a result of this experience, Gottshall became extremely
distraught and unable to work during the next few days without
thinking about the events surrounding his friend's death.'14 He
eventually sought professional psychiatric attention, and was
diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and
major depression. 49 Gottshall also experienced other physical
and psychological side-effects such as suicidal tendencies, anxi-
ety, weight loss, nausea, insomnia and recurring nightmares. 150
Gottshall then brought a FELA claim against the railroad,
alleging that its negligence "created the circumstances under
which he had been forced to observe and participate in the
Rail Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993). This Note focuses only on the facts from the
Gottshall decision.
140. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2409-11.
141. Id. at 2400.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2400-01.
145. Id. at 2401.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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events surrounding [his friend's] death."151 Although the dis-
trict court determined that a remedy under FELA was not
available for Gottshall's emotional distress injuries, the Third
Circuit reversed this ruling. 152 In doing so, it disregarded all of
the traditionally recognized common law tests because of their
"harsh and unfair results." 53 Given the tension that exists be-
tween the limiting effect of these common law tests and the
more liberal recovery policy of FELA, the circuit court stated
that preference should be given to the latter by discarding these
"doctrinal common law distinctions.., when they bar recovery
on meritorious FELA claims." 54 Instead, the circuit proposed
its own "genuineness" test.155 It reasoned that judges should be
capable of "weeding out" frivolous claims on their own by care-
fully scrutinizing the facts, and determining whether they "pro-
vide [the] threshold assurance. that there is a likelihood of
genuine and serious emotional injury." 56
Because Gottshall had satisfied the circuit's "genuineness"
standard (by offering sufficient proof to substantiate the genu-
ineness and severity of his injuries), and he alleged the FELA
elements needed to present genuine issues of material fact, the
Third Circuit remanded the case for trial. 57 In response to
Conrail's petition for review, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari so that it could address this issue held over from Buell and
resolve the conflict that had developed among the circuits. 58
On review, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and criti-
cized its rejection of the common law developments. 159 After ex-
amining the remedial and humanitarian purpose of FELA, and
the liberal construction traditionally given to it by the Court in
order to further these goals, the Court agreed that damages
from negligent infliction of emotional distress may be recover-
151. Id.
152. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3rd Cir. 1993).
153. Id. at 367-68.
154. Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 371.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 374, 383.
158. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2403.
159. Id. at 2408. The Court said that "[b]y treating the common-law tests as
mere arbitrary restrictions to be disregarded if they stand in the way of recovery
on 'meritorious' FELA claims, the Third Circuit put the cart before the horse...."
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able under the statute.160 Quoting the Third Circuit's own
words, it acknowledged that "severe emotional injuries can be
just as debilitating as physical injuries."161 However, unlike the
Third Circuit, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
"gleaning guidance" from the common law in FELA jurispru-
dence. 162 Relying on its prior opinion in Buell, the Court noted
that "[FELA] is founded on common-law concepts of negligence
and injury," and, except for certain modifications, qualifications,
or alterations in the language of the statute, these common law
concepts "are entitled to great weight in [a FELA] analysis." 63
Therefore, the Court determined that "common-law principles
must play a significant role" in the issue at hand because the
statute did not address negligent infliction of emotional
distress.164
Based on this premise, the Court viewed the circuit's deci-
sion as being "fatally flawed" for failing to adopt one of the
traditional, common law tests used to define and limit a rail-
road's duty under these circumstances. 65 Although most juris-
dictions have recognized a right to recover for emotional
distress, the Court pointed out that none would permit recovery
for all incidences of emotional harm that might be causally
linked to another person's negligence. 16 6 Instead, various
"rules" or "tests" have been adopted and applied by the courts in
order to balance different policy considerations and to set logical
limitations on the liability that may be imposed. 67 Without
such limitations to emotional distress recovery, courts have rec-
ognized that certain problems would inevitably result. 68 These
problems include the risk of flooding the courts with trivial
suits, the possibility of entertaining falsified or imagined claims
(due to the difficulty in determining the validity and scope of
emotional injury), and the potential for placing infinite and un-
160. Id. at 2407.
161. Id. at 2408 (quoting Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 361).
162. Id. at 2404, 2408.
163. Id. at 2404.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2408.
166. Id. at 2405.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2405-06, 2411.
594 [Vol. 15:575
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/6
"AIDS-PHOBIA"1995] 595
predictable liability upon defendants who may not reasonably
foresee certain emotional injuries. 16 9
After examining what it characterized as the three major
limiting tests, (the "physical impact" test, the "zone of danger"
test, and the "relative bystander" test),170 the Court found that
the common-law zone of danger test was the proper standard to
apply in FELA claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.17'
Compared to the other tests, or alternatively, no test at all,
the Court reasoned that the "zone of danger test best reconciles
the concern of the common law with the principles underlying
our FELA jurisprudence."172 Because the zone of danger test
would encompass all cognizable claims under the physical im-
pact test, the Court believed that Congress' primary goal of "al-
leviating the physical dangers of railroading," and
compensating for injuries and death that arise from these phys-
ical dangers, would still be furthered.173 However, unlike the
more restrictive physical impact test, it would allow employees
who develop emotional injury caused by the fear of a physical
impact to recover despite the absence of an actual impact. 174
Accordingly, an employer would not be relieved from liability in
the fortuitous event that an impact did not occur. 175 Also, the
Court found historical support for the zone of danger test. 76
Although not as widely accepted as the physical impact test
upon FELA's enactment in 1908, it was nevertheless in exist-
ence at that time and utilized by a significant number of juris-
dictions177 The Court concluded that Congress could have
reasonably intended for the more progressive zone of danger
test to operate in FELA situations because it "would have been
more consistent ... with FELA's broad remedial goals." 78
169. Id.
170. Id at 2406-07. See infra note 58 for a discussion of the different common
law tests.
171. Id. at 2410.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2410-11.
174. Id. at 2411.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2410.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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On the other hand, the Court found no historical support
for the relative bystander test, and commented on its lack of
relevancy to most FELA cases. 179 It noted that most states ap-
plying this test only permit recovery where an individual wit-
nesses the death or severe injury of a close family member. 80
Because FELA allows only railroad employees and their estates
to bring claims under the statute, the Court stated that "it
would be a rare occurrence for a worker to witness during the
course of his employment the injury or death of a close family
member."' 81
Despite Gottshall's contention that the zone of danger test
would arbitrarily exclude some valid emotional injury claims,
the Court ultimately found that it best reconciled the common
law concerns (especially the fear of unlimited and unpredictable
liability) with the Court's FELA jurisprudence. 8 2 Therefore,
the zone of danger test, which limits recovery to those plaintiffs
who either sustain a physical impact or are placed in immediate
risk of physical impact, was the standard accepted by the
Supreme Court to govern FELA claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 8 3
D. State Law Treatment of AIDS-phobia Cases
Although there is now a uniform federal standard for evalu-
ating negligently inflicted emotional distress under FELA,
cases involving disease-phobia claims (such as "cancer-phobia"
and "asbestosis-phobia") demonstrate that the problem may not
be completely solved. Due to the latent nature of such diseases,
and the inability of experts to immediately and accurately de-
tect their presence in claimants, courts are faced with an even
tougher job trying to discern the validity of emotional distress
in these situations. This problem becomes particularly appar-
ent when the disease involved is AIDS.18 4
179. Id. at 2411.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The case was remanded to the Third Circuit to determine whether
Gottshall could have satisfied the zone of danger requirements. Id.
184. Statistics report that HIV kills approximately 81% of infected individu-
als within three years after developing full blown AIDS. Darby, supra note 3, at
185 n. 1 (citing Abdullah Fatteh et al., AIDS: An Exhaustive Review of Medical and
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Because there are no previous FELA cases dealing directly
with AIDS-phobia, one must look to non-FELA case law devel-
opments for guidance. 8 5 This section examines how various
state courts, including New York, and various federal courts ap-
plying state law, have addressed the issue of AIDS-phobia re-
covery in their jurisdictions. Just as federal courts had adopted
different tests for recovery in general, FELA emotional distress
recovery cases, states have also adopted different prerequisites
for recovery in cases dealing with the fear of contracting AIDS.
The following two groups of cases demonstrate the major split
in authority with respect to AIDS-phobia jurisprudence.
1. Channel of Exposure Requirement
A good number of courts have dismissed AIDS-phobia
claims where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate an actual "chan-
nel of exposure" to the HIV virus, or a documented injury in the
form of testing positive for HIV.l86 For example, in Burk v. Sage
Products, 87 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed an
AIDS-phobia claim under Pennsylvania state law. 8 The plain-
tiff in that case, a hospital paramedic, was pricked by a used
hypodermic needle protruding out of a defective disposable syr-
inge waste container. 89 Although several AIDS-infected pa-
tients had been seen on his particular hospital floor that day,
the plaintiff failed to prove that any of them had used the nee-
Legal Aspects, in LEGAL MED. 1986, at 3 (1986)). However, the incubation period
for the disease, (from the point of initial HIV exposure to the point of physical
manifestation of AIDS symptoms), is highly unpredictable. Id. at 186 n.4. Most
experts agree that this latent incubation period varies widely from individual to
individual, and can range from several months to more than seven years. Id.
Thus, an HIV-infected individual always has the potential to develop or transmit
AIDS, even if the physical symptoms lie dormant for years. Id. Despite this elu-
sive latency period between HIV infection and actual AIDS manifestation, studies
report that detecting the HIV virus itself is generally more immediate and accu-
rate. 38 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. s-7 (July 21, 1989) (stating that at
least 95% of HIV infected individuals test positive for the virus within six months
of acquiring it, even though AIDS may not manifest for several years).
185. Courts must "glean guidance" from the common law in FELA and Jones
Act jurisprudence. See, e.g., Marriott v. Sedco Forex Intl Resources, Ltd., 827 F.
Supp. 59, 73 (D. Mass. 1993) (referring to the Supreme Court's language in Buell).
186. Id. at 74.
187. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
188. Id. at 288.
189. Id. at 286.
1995] 597
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
dle in question. 190 In addition, he later tested negative for the
HIV virus five times. 191 The court subsequently dismissed his
claim on grounds that he failed to establish actual exposure to
HIV.192 It conceded that most Pennsylvania courts would recog-
nize an emotional injury claim so long as the emotional injury
was accompanied by some manifestation of a physical injury. 193
However, when emotional distress results from the fear of con-
tracting a disease, an additional "exposure" element would be
required as well. 94
The court in Burk adhered to the Third Circuit's decision in
Wisniewski v. John-Manville Corp., 95 which affirmed the dis-
missal of several asbestosis-phobia claims on a similar the-
ory.196 The appellants in that case, wives and children of
several deceased asbestos workers, sought to recover for their
fear of contracting cancer due to possible second-hand "house-
hold" exposure to asbestos brought in on their husbands' and
fathers' contaminated work clothes over the years. 97 Although
the claimants alleged emotional distress injuries in the form of
identifiable "physical" headaches, they failed to allege any inju-
ries or symptoms that could be medically linked to the asbestos
as proof of an actual exposure.198 After analyzing Wisniewski,
the court in Burk concluded that "while injuries stemming from
a fear of contracting illness after exposure to a disease-causing
agent may present compensable damages, injuries stemming
from fear of the initial exposure do not."199 Thus, Burk acknowl-
edged that AIDS-phobia recovery could be allowed in certain
situations, but not where there was a question as to the initial
exposure.
200
The court in Burk further grounded its decision in logic and
policy considerations. It admitted that the long incubation pe-
riod in which AIDS symptoms lie dormant may produce uncer-
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 288.
193. Id. at 286-87.
194. Id. at 287.
195. 759 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1985).
196. Id. at 274.
197. Id. at 273.
198. Id. at 273-74.
199. Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288.
200. Id. at 287.
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tainty as to an actual exposure.2 01 However, it also reasoned
that a person infected with HIV "[would] still test positive for
the HIV virus during this latency period," and that the virus
could usually be detected within six months after exposure. 202
Thus, one year and five negative blood tests later, the court was
unwilling to allow recovery for his AIDS-phobia after it had be-
come substantially certain that the disease would not
develop.203
This exposure requirement was also relied upon by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Johnson v. West
Virginia University Hospital20 4 to affirm a jury award for AIDS-
phobia damages. 20 5 The appellee in that case, a police officer,
was bitten in the arm while attempting to restrain an AIDS-
infected hospital patient.20 6 Evidence demonstrated that the
patient had previously bitten his own arm, and had some in-
fected blood in his mouth at the time he bit the appellee. 2 7 Af-
ter analyzing decisions from other jurisdictions on this issue,
the court agreed that "before a recovery for emotional distress
damages... [is allowed] ... there must first be exposure to the
disease."208 Based on the facts surrounding the bite wound, the
court found that the officer definitely established a potential
channel of exposure to satisfy this requirement. 2°9 The court
also believed that his emotional injuries were reasonable,
notwithstanding his negative HIV test results and his failure to
contract the disease three years after the incident occurred. 210
To support this reasonableness determination, the court placed
great weight on the fact that he "was actually exposed to the
AIDS virus."21 1
201. Id. at 288.
202. Id. (citing statistics from 38 MORBmDrrY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. S-7
(July 21, 1989)).
203. Id. at 288. The court also disregarded the physical "contact" from the
needle prick as a sufficient basis for the claim. Id. n.2. It stated that the lacera-
tion did not demonstrate an injury from exposure to the AIDS virus, but merely an
injury by "exposure to a hypodermic needle." Id.
204. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
205. Id. at 894.
206. Id. at 891.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 893.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 891.
211. Id. at 894.
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In Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Commu-
nity Hospital,212 the same court affirmed the dismissal of an
AIDS-phobia claim where the appellant failed to satisfy the ex-
posure requirement.213 There, a mortician sued a hospital and a
doctor for releasing a corpse to him without disclosing that it
was infected with AIDS.214 He sought recovery for damages
based on his AIDS-phobia related emotional injuries.21 5 He
claimed that if he had known the body was infected, he would
have worn additional protective garments during the embalm-
ing process. 216 However, the court noted that the appellant had
not alleged any physical impairments as a result of the incident,
and could not prove an exposure to the disease by any medi-
cally-established means known to transmit the virus. 21 7 In fact,
the evidence demonstrated that he was wearing proper protec-
tive gear, he did not stick himself with any contaminated in-
struments, and he did not puncture his gloves during the course
of the embalming process. 218 The court, referring to Burk and
Wisniewski, and relying on its prior opinion in Johnson, con-
cluded that a claimant must first show exposure to the AIDS
virus before recovery would be allowed.219 It stated that "if a
suit for damages is based solely upon the plaintiff's fear of con-
tracting AIDS, but there is no evidence of an actual exposure to
the virus, the fear is unreasonable, and . . . not . . . a legally
compensable injury."220 Since the appellant did not show an ac-
tual exposure to the virus, and he subsequently tested negative
four times for HIV antibodies, his claim for AIDS-phobia was
dismissed. 221
Several New York courts have also applied this exposure
requirement. In Hare v. State,222 the Second Department af-
212. 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Courtney v.
Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436, 442-43 (W. Va. 1993).
213. Id. at 84.
214. Id. at 80-81.
215. Id. at 81.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 82-83.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 83-84.
220. Id. at 84.
221. Id. at 82, 84.
222. 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d
859, 580 N.E.2d 1058, 575 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1991).
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firmed a lower court's denial of an AIDS-phobia claim.223 There,
a hospital x-ray technician was bitten by a prison inmate while
attempting to prevent the inmate from committing suicide in
the hospital. 224 Although one of the nurses at the scene thought
the inmate might have had AIDS, this fact was never substanti-
ated at trial.225 The court ultimately affirmed the denial of re-
covery because the claimant failed to prove that the inmate had
AIDS, and because the claimant himself had tested HIV nega-
tive several times after the incident. 226 It decided that the evi-
dence of emotional distress was too "remote and speculative,"
even in light of his documented physical bite injury and subse-
quent manifestation of weight loss. 2 27
In another case, Doe v. Doe,228 a New York supreme court
upheld an exposure requirement when it dismissed a wife's
claim for AIDS-phobia damages against her husband. 229 There,
the wife had filed for divorce after learning of her husband's ex-
tra-marital homosexual affairs. She alleged in a separate cause
of action that his status as a high-risk AIDS candidate caused
her to develop severe emotional and psychological distress.230
Accordingly, in addition to the equitable share of their marital
property she would have received under New York law, she
sought separate compensation for alleged damages arising from
her fear of contracting AIDS.231 Among the several principles
relied upon to deny recovery, the court focused heavily on her
failure to offer proof that she had actually been exposed to
AIDS.23 2 It noted that her husband had actually tested negative
for the HIV virus, and that she had refused to take an HIV test
223. Id. at 525, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
224. Id. at 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
225. Id. at 524, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
226. Id. at 524-25, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
227. Id.
228. 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987).
229. Id. at 1021, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599-60.
230. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
231. Id. at 1018-19, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
232. Id. at 1020, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599. The court also characterized this as an
attempt to circumvent New York's equitable distribution rules with respect to the
division of marital property. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597. Because New York
only looks at fault in exceptional circumstances, the court reasoned that this point
should be argued in her matrimonial cause of action, and not as an independent
cause of action. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98.
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to help support her position.m The court found her fear to be
unreasonable since it was based not on an actual exposure, but
merely on the fact "that she may have been exposed to AIDS."234
Also, the court refused to open up what it believed would be a
"Pandora's box" of emotional distress claims. 235 It believed that
"any party to a matrimonial action who alleged adultery would
.. have a separate tort action for damages for 'AIDS-phobia'"
since extra-marital sexual activity increases the risk of expo-
sure to AIDS.236
One other New York court also appeared to uphold an expo-
sure requirement in Ordway v. County of Suffolk.23 7 In that
case, a prisoner was sent to a hospital emergency room where
he underwent two successive operations during the course of a
one-week period.23 8 After the second operation, the plaintiff-
surgeon discovered that the prisoner was HIV positive, and
plaintiff subsequently developed a fear of contracting AIDS.239
Although he had worn the usual surgical garments and gear
during the operations, the plaintiff alleged that he would have
taken additional precautions had he known of the patient's con-
dition.24° The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim be-
cause of his failure to allege any unusual occurrence during the
operations, such as "[a] broken glove, pierced skin, patient bite,
etc.," which could distinguish them from any other ordinary op-
eration.241 Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff had not
tested positive for the HIV virus, or demonstrated any other in-
dicia of legitimacy in his postoperative condition.242 Although
not stating in express terms, the court appeared to espouse an
exposure requirement by determining that the plaintiff could
not recover for his mere fear and uncertainty of contracting
AIDS.23
233. Id. at 1021, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
234. Id. at 1020, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
235. Id. at 1019, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
236. Id.
237. 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992).
238. Id. at 270, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1015.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 273, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17.
242. Id. at 273, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
243. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee also upheld an exposure
requirement for AIDS-phobia recovery in Carroll v. Sisters of
Saint Francis Health Services.24 4 There, a hospital visitor was
pricked by several hypodermic needles after she accidentally
reached her hand into a used needle receptacle that resembled
a paper towel dispenser.2 5 Besides the physical puncture
wounds to her fingers, the plaintiff alleged anxieties and emo-
tional distress caused from her fear of contracting AIDS.246 The
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's AIDS-phobia claim since she
could not prove that the needles specifically exposed her to the
HIV virus.247 However, after interpreting what it believed was
the proper standard under Tennessee case law for disease-pho-
bia cases, the appellate court repudiated the "strict rules of ac-
tual exposure imposed by the courts in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia."248 Instead of focusing on whether an actual HIV ex-
posure occurred, the appellate court looked to whether the
plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS, after being exposed to need-
les that were "presumably" contaminated, was reasonable
under the circumstances.2 9 In answering this question affirma-
tively, it looked to extrinsic factors to support the reasonable-
ness of her fear. 250 The appellate court made note of the unique
and unpredictable characteristics of the AIDS virus, as well as
the presumption in the medical field that "all body substances
and all instruments that have or may have been in contact with
those body substances, including any and all discarded needles,
are contaminated with the AIDS virus and are capable of trans-
mitting AIDS to a person."25 '
The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to accept such a lib-
eralized interpretation of its past disease-phobia cases. 252 In-
stead, it expressly adopted the more objective "actual exposure"
244. 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
245. Id. at 586.
246. Id. at 587.
247. Id.
248. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-
CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) citations omitted.
249. Id. at *4-*5.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585,
593 (Tenn. 1993).
1995] 603
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
standard.253 It stated that in order to recover for AIDS-phobia
damages, "the plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that he or
she was actually exposed to HIV."254
Finally, The Supreme Court of Idaho also adopted a similar
position in the recent case of Neal v. Neal.255 There, a wife al-
leged emotional injury based on her fear of contracting AIDS
and other sexually transmitted diseases after her husband had
an extra-marital affair.2 56 Although the court agreed that the
plaintiff might have been subjected to an increased risk of con-
tracting such diseases, it affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
her claim since she was unable to demonstrate an actual expo-
sure.257 According to the record, the plaintiff failed to allege
that her husband or his lover had any sexually transmitted dis-
eases. Moreover, she had not contracted any diseases from
them.258 Relying on Carroll, Burk, Funeral Services by Gregory,
and Doe, the court found that "there can be no reasonable fear
of contracting such a disease absent proof of actual exposure."259
2. Specific Incident of Potential Exposure
Other courts have sustained causes of action where the
plaintiff could allege a specific incident of "potential exposure"
that created a reasonable fear of contracting AIDS, even in the
absence of an actual, established channel of exposure to the vi-
rus.260 For example, In Faya v. Almarez,261 the Maryland Court
of Appeals sustained two plaintiffs' causes of action on this the-
ory.26 2 There, two breast cancer patients of an ADS-infected
253. Id. at 594.
254. Id.
255. 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994).
256. Id. at 873, 876.
257. Id. at 876.
258. Id.
259. Id. Because the plaintiff failed to establish that her fear was "reason-
able," the court did not have to address the second issue of whether her emotional
distress was "sufficiently genuine." Id.
260. In addition to the two cases mentioned in this section, see also Poole v.
Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (N.D. 111. 1988) (finding that a
wife, whose hemophiliac husband contracted AIDS from the defendant's an-
tihemophilic factor, alleged facts sufficient to place her in the zone of danger, but
was denied recovery under Illinois law because she failed to allege a requisite
physical injury arising from the emotional distress).
261. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
262. Id. at 339.
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surgeon sought emotional distress recovery for their fear of con-
tracting AIDS after the surgeon performed surgery on them.26 3
The trial court dismissed both claims because the plaintiffs had
failed to allege exposure to HIV by any accident or incident dur-
ing the surgery that would have caused the doctor's blood to
commingle with their own.264 The court of appeals, however, re-
versed the lower court's decision. 265 It instead ruled that pa-
tients who are operated on by AIDS-infected doctors may have
valid claims for AIDS-phobia, even though they have not identi-
fied an actual mode of transmission or tested HIV positive. 266
Similarly, in Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co.,267 a
plaintiff's AIDS-phobia claim was sustained, despite an absence
of proof of exposure.268 There, a cleaning worker was stuck by a
discarded hypodermic needle used for taking blood samples as
she was gathering trash from a waste container.2 9 She alleged
emotional injuries from the fear of contracting AIDS as a result
of the needle puncture.270 The defendant-insurance company
argued that her fear was merely speculative and based on her
own "ignorance, fear and hysteria."27'1 However, the court sus-
tained her cause of action.272 It ruled that if this type of emo-
tional injury is "tied to a distinct event which could cause a
reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like
AIDS, there is a guarantee of genuineness of the claim."
273
More importantly, the court focused on the current develop-
263. Id. at 329-30.
264. Id. at 330.
265. Id. at 339.
266. Id. at 336-37. The court stated that the exposure requirement of Burk
would "unfairly punish them for lacking the requisite information to prove an ac-
tual transmission." Id. at 337. However, the court did mention that the plaintiff's
continued AIDS-phobia after receiving negative HIV test results would probably
be deemed unreasonable: "Once appellants learned of their HIV-negative status
more than a year after their respective surgeries, the possibility of contracting
AIDS... became extremely unlikely... and... might be deemed unreasonable."
Id. Thus, their recovery should be limited to a period "constituting their reason-
able window of anxiety." Id.
267. 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991).
268. Id. at 7, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
269. Id. at 2, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
270. Id. at 3, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
271. Id. at 4, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
272. Id. at 5, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
273. Id.
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ments in the AIDS arena as a way to further verify the genuine-
ness of her fear.274 It acknowledged society's increased
awareness of the primary modes of AIDS transmission, espe-
cially in light of the massive AIDS educational campaign. 275
Also, the dormant qualities of the virus prevent it from being
physically detected for many years after an incident of expo-
sure.276 The court determined that "any reasonable person ex-
posed to this information who is stuck by a used and discarded
hypodermic needle and syringe from which blood was appar-
ently drawn could develop a fear of contracting AIDS."27v
III. Case: Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co.
The plaintiff, John Marchica, was employed as a structural
welder for the Long Island Railroad ("LIRR).278 On October 25,
1989, he and several co-workers were assigned to the Hemp-
stead Railroad Station to secure a protective metal window
grating over a basement window shaft.279 The purpose of this
project was to prevent vagrants in the area from breaking into
the building and gaining access into the trainman's room.28°
These break-ins, which had become a recurring problem for the
railroad, were of particular concern because drug addicts, ille-
gal aliens, and prostitutes were known to frequent the sta-
tion.2s1 In fact, evidence indicated that hypodermic needles,
crack vials and other drug paraphernalia were often found on
the floor of the trainman's room and in other parts of the
station.282
As the men began to weld the grate in place with their acet-
ylene torches, they noticed that a pile of leaves, sticks, broken
glass, paper and other garbage lying in the bottom of the shaft
274. Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98.
275. Id. (citing statistics from Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Trans-
mission in Health Care Settings, 36 MORBIDTrry AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. s-2, s-3
(Supp. 1987)).
276. Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
277. Id.
278. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1200 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
606 [Vol. 15:575
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/6
"AIDS-PHOBIA"
presented a potential fire hazard.283 Marchica volunteered to
clear away the smoldering debris from their work area.2 4 As he
reached into the pile to push some of the garbage aside,
Marchica felt a sharp pain in his right hand.2 5 He immediately
pulled his hand out of the pile and discovered that a discarded
hypodermic needle had pierced his protective work glove and
was sticking in his right palm.28 6
Subsequently, Marchica removed the needle and was taken
to nearby Winthrop University Hospital to have his hand ex-
amined. 28 7 The doctor attending the wound advised him to get
tested for HIV, to receive a tetanus and hepatitis shot, and to
abstain from having sexual relations with his wife.288 Later
that same day, doctors at the LIRR medical department also
examined his finger. 289 They, on the other hand, advised him
not to worry, and to merely "go home and wash his hands with
warm soapy water."290 In fact, they even disposed of the hypo-
dermic needle without testing to find out whether the needle or
blood contained in the syringe was contaminated in any way. 291
Following the advice given at Winthrop, Marchica received an
initial HIV test several days after the incident. 292 He also had
additional blood tests taken one month, six months, and one
year after the incident.293
Due to the needle puncture, and the information he re-
ceived from the doctors at Winthrop, Marchica developed vari-
ous anxieties and emotional problems.2 94 He even sought
professional help from a psychologist, and had anti-depressants
prescribed to him by a psychiatrist.29 5 Marchica eventually re-
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. One of Marchica's co-workers testified that he observed blood in the
barrel of the hypodermic, and also saw blood coming from Marchica's puncture
wound. Id.
288. Id. at 1200-01.
289. Id. at 1200.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1200-01.
292. Id. at 1200.
293. Id. at 1201.
294. Id. He experienced severe weight loss after the incident, and witnesses
had observed him crying and vomiting on different occasions. Id.
295. Id.
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ceived negative HIV results back from his blood tests during the
course of his psychiatric treatment. 296 One final blood test
taken two years later also produced negative HIV results.297
Marchica then brought a FELA action against the railroad
in June of 1992.298 He alleged that the LIRR's negligence in
"failing to provide him with a safe place to work," proximately
caused the physical injury to his hand, and his fear of con-
tracting AIDS.299 In response, the LIRR moved to dismiss all of
Marchica's AIDS-phobia related claims on the basis that he
failed to prove actual exposure to the HIV virus, and that he
had further tested negative for the virus.300 Relying on cases
which have required proof of actual exposure for disease-phobia
recovery, the LIRR contended that his emotional distress dam-
ages were too speculative and not compensable. 301
In addressing this case, the court had to first determine
"whether a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
[was] cognizable under FELA."30 2 It answered this question in
the affirmative by acknowledging the broad, remedial FELA
standards, and the fact that recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress under the statute was well-established
(notwithstanding the application of different common-law tests
among the circuits).30 3 In this particular situation, the district
court found that because Marchica suffered a precipitating
physical injury, the claim could be substantiated by applying a
traditional physical "impact" requirement.
30 4
Second, the court had to look to the common law for gui-
dance on the exposure issue in AIDS-phobia cases.30 5 Following
courts that had rejected a strict exposure requirement, the
court instead placed greater weight on the surrounding factual
circumstances to determine the reasonableness of Marchica's
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 488.
302. Id. at 449.
303. Id. at 450-51. See supra note 58.
304. Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 450, 453.
305. Id. at 451-52.
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fear.306 The court concluded that being physically pricked by a
used hypodermic needle from an unknown source might present
a genuine and reasonable claim for emotional injury, even in
the absence of actual exposure to the HIV virus.307
The court denied the LIRR's motion for summary judg-
ment, and ruled that the validity of Marchica's emotional injury
and the issue of the LIRR's negligence were both factual ques-
tions for the jury.30 8 The case then proceeded to trial where a
jury found the railroad partially liable, and awarded Marchica
compensation for both his past and future emotional distress
damages.30 9
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the LIRR raised three is-
sues in opposition to the lower court's judgment.310 It first con-
tended that recovery for AIDS-phobia was erroneously
permitted in this case because the lower court had not applied
the proper legal standard.31 ' Specifically, the LIRR asserted
that proof of exposure plus "a reasonable medical probability" of
acquiring AIDS must be demonstrated before a plaintiff can re-
cover for AIDS-phobia emotional distress damages.31 2 Because
Marchica had proven neither of these, the LIRR asserted that
his fear of developing AIDS was unreasonable as a matter of
law.313 Next, the railroad argued that Marchica's fear was not
objectively rational since he was not informed as to the medical
realities of AIDS and how the virus could be transmitted.314 Fi-
nally, the LIRR contended that even if proof of exposure was not
required to support a claim for AIDS-phobia recovery under
FELA, a limit should be placed on the recovery measured by
"the time between the possible exposure and when the plaintiff
could have learned to a medical certainty that he had not been
exposed or would not develop the disease."315 Therefore, his
award for future damages should not have been permitted.3 16
306. Id. at 452.
307. Id. at 453.
308. Id.
309. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1201.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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In a de novo review of the district court's decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit first affirmed that negligently inflicted emotional
distress presented an actionable injury under the statute.3 17
Although it acknowledged the remedial nature of FELA and an-
alyzed the various common-law principles that had evolved
throughout the states,318 the court merely had to look to Gott-
shall for its answer. 319 Because Marchica suffered a physical
puncture wound, he satisfied the common law "zone of danger"
test recently espoused by the Supreme Court for FELA negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims.3 20 Therefore, he
could properly recover damages "for all injuries-physical and
emotional-proximately caused by the physical impact."3 21
The Second Circuit next looked to common law disease-pho-
bia and AIDS-phobia developments in order to determine
whether AIDS-phobia emotional distress injuries, specifically
where exposure to the disease had not been proven, were recov-
erable. 322 It first rejected the LIRR's assertion that certain fear-
of-future-disease jurisprudence, rather than traditional negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress analysis, should govern.3 23
The various cases proffered by the railroad held that in the dis-
ease-phobia situations presented, the plaintiff had to show at a
minimum that actual exposure, plus a reasonable medical like-
lihood of developing the disease in the future, existed before re-
covery could be permitted. 324 Some of the cases even required
the plaintiff to show something more, such as a present injury
caused by the exposure, reasonable certainty that future injury
would occur, or a physical manifestation of the emotional dis-
tress injuries. 325 The Second Circuit, however, rejected this po-
sition on grounds that such "analysis applies only '[w]ith
respect to infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury
317. Id. at 1202-04.
318. Id. at 1202-03. The court set forth and analyzed the various tests ("phys-
ical impact," "zone of danger," "bystander test," "manifestation of physical injury"
and "foreseeability test") which have been upheld in different jurisdictions. Id.
319. Id. at 1203.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1204.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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or contact.' "326 It reasoned that proof of exposure (or any addi-
tional requirement) was needed only when no physical injury
occurred that could help guarantee the genuineness of the
plaintiffs' claim.3 2 7 Therefore, this line of case-law upholding a
strict exposure requirement was inapplicable to Marchica's sit-
uation.328 Because he sustained an actual physical injury, "the
traditional negligent infliction of emotional distress analysis
applie[d]." 329
Looking next to specific AIDS-phobia developments, the
court recognized that inconsistent case law had emerged in this
area.330 The LIRR pointed to the numerous cases which have
upheld an exposure requirement, or exposure plus something
more, as a prerequisite to recovery. 331 However, after noting
that several courts rejected a strict, actual exposure require-
ment,332 the Second Circuit was not convinced that a common-
law rule requiring "proof of exposure and a medical likelihood of
developing the disease" had been established. 333 Instead, the
court applied the same reasoning it had used for general fear-of-
developing-disease cases, and found that an exposure require-
ment is only needed when "the traditional tests of genuineness
in negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress cases" cannot be
satisfied.334 Because Marchica satisfied the zone of danger test,
and because of the broad and remedial nature of FELA, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected a strict exposure requirement in this con-
326. Id. (citing Nesom v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1993), a
case relied upon by the LIRR).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1206.
331. Id. at 1204-05 (citing, inter alia, Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F.
Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994); Carroll v.
Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993); Funeral
Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va.
1991); Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991); Hare
v. State, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991); Ordway v. County of
Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992); and
Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987)).
332. Id. at 1205-06 (citing Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp.
1367 (N.D. M11. 1988); Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Castro v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991)).
333. Id. at 1205.
334. Id.
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text as well.33 5 It ultimately concluded that his claim was
actionable, and that "a FELA plaintiff who has suffered a physi-
cal impact may recover for fear of developing AIDS if the impact
caused by the defendant's negligence occurred under circum-
stances that would cause a reasonable person to develop a fear
of AIDS."336
The Second Circuit also rejected the LIRR's second argu-
ment and found that there was a rational basis for Marchica's
emotional distress.337 In light of the vast AIDS-awareness cam-
paign, which has identified the sharing of contaminated needles
and syringes as a viable means of transmission, the court deter-
mined that a jury could find this fear reasonable. 338 As for the
LIRR's last point concerning future damages, the LIRR argued
that Marchica had tested HIV-negative three times over the
course of three years.339 The LIRR claimed that, as a matter of
law, "any continuing emotional distress stemming from a fear of
developing AIDS" after Marchica was medically certain he
would not acquire the disease was unreasonable. 34° Although
the court agreed that such a continuing fear would be unreason-
able, it distinguished this "unreasonable" fear of developing the
AIDS disease from the permanent nature of post traumatic
stress disorder which did constitute valid and compensable fu-
ture emotional distress.341 Because Marchica's expert testi-
mony emphasized this distinction, the court found it to be a
sufficient basis for the future emotional distress award. 342
IV. Analysis
A. The FELA Issue
The Second Circuit properly concluded that a plaintiff's
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be cogni-
zable under the provisions of FELA.3 3 As previously discussed,
335. Id. at 1205-06.
336. Id. at 1206.
337. Id. at 1206-07.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1207.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1207-08.
342. Id. at 1208.
343. Id. at 1202-05.
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the Supreme Court has consistently held that the statute is
broad and remedial in nature, and should therefore be liberally
construed to achieve Congress' objectives. 344 Consequently, this
has enabled railroad employees to recover under FELA provi-
sions for a wide variety of injuries besides those which are more
commonly associated with railroad negligence. 345 Examples of
such compensable, non-traditional injuries now frequently in-
volve claims for emotional distress.
Moreover, the common law tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress has gained wide recognition in a majority of
states. 346 Indeed, the Second Circuit acknowledged the long-
standing principle "that if a negligent actor's conduct results in
a physical injury for which there is liability, the actor is also
liable for whatever emotional harm stems from the physical in-
jury."347 Because FELA jurisprudence looks to the common law
for guidance,34 claims for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress should also be actionable under FELA. Thus, when the
court affirmed Marchica's AIDS-phobia award, it was merely
following the well-established trend of permitting liberal FELA
recovery.
The only other issue in the FELA inquiry, which the Second
Circuit did not have to contend with, concerned the appropriate
prerequisite for emotional distress recovery that should apply
under the statute. Previously, the lack of a uniform FELA stan-
dard had provided a source of disagreement between the cir-
cuits. 349 At trial, the district court had to determine how it
could substantiate the genuineness of Marchica's emotional
harm. After finding that Marchica had suffered a physical in-
jury from the puncture wound, the district court was able to jus-
tify its decision under the strict "physical impact" test.350 In
light of the generous FELA standards, and the impetus by some
344. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 43.
346. KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 363-66.
347. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1202.
348. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1987).
349. See supra part II.C.1.
350. Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 449-50. The court specifically emphasized
that this was one for "psychological difficulties following a particular type of physi-
cal injury." Id.
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courts to permit recovery for wholly emotional injury,351 this de-
cision was a relatively conservative one because the court did
not have to abandon a traditional, common law test. The lan-
guage used by the court even limited its decision to only those
AIDS-phobia actions premised specifically on "a documented
physical injury sustained by the plaintiff."35 2
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, easily relied upon
Gottshall to find that Marchica met the zone of danger test ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court as the appropriate standard
under FELA. Because the Supreme Court decided that this
best reconciled the common law concerns of limiting potential
liability with the remedial objectives of FELA,353 the circuit
court did not have to engage in a lengthy analysis. It correctly
held that Marchica "suffered a physical impact," and was there-
fore entitled to receive compensation for all of his physical and
emotional injuries "proximately caused by the physical
impact."354
This Note does not attempt to discuss whether the outcome
reached in Gottshall was proper. However, it should be noted
that the "impact" rule (which is the foundation of the "zone of
danger" test) has received criticism in the past and has been
abandoned in many jurisdictions.35 5 Some criticism has focused
on situations where the injury from an impact is relatively in-
significant, and lacks the trustworthiness to support an emo-
351. See supra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
352. Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 449.
353. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2410 (1994).
354. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1203. The court also pointed out that Marchica
could have satisfied the "physical manifestation test" and "foreseeability test" as
well. Id.
355. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 545-56. In toxic tort cases, many jurisdic-
tions have abandoned the stricter, but not necessarily more accurate "impact" re-
quirement as a screening device for emotional injury claims. Id. Instead, they
have adopted a "manifestation" test as a way to guarantee the genuineness of the
claim. Id. A few others have gone even further by abandoning the traditional tests
altogether and merely looking to the seriousness and reasonableness of the emo-
tional distress based on the surrounding circumstances. Id. See also Susan J.
Zook, Under What Circumstances Should Courts Allow Recovery for Emotional
Distress Based Upon the Fear of Contracting Aids? Johnson v. West Virginia Hos-
pitals, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991), 43 J. URBAN & CoNTEMP. L. 481, 483-87
(1993).
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tional injury claim.3 56 One might argue that a needle-prick
injury is also a rather insubstantial and inaccurate means of
justifying the extent of alleged emotional injury in AIDS-phobia
situations. However, given the realities of the AIDS crisis, the
deadly and elusive characteristics of the disease, and society's
increasing knowledge and concern for the epidemic, the better
position is that such an injury can be enough to support an
award for emotional distress injuries. Indeed, the Second Cir-
cuit properly acknowledged that the emotional distress flowing
from Marchica's needle-prick impact was "reasonably foresee-
able, as it was of the sort that a person in his circumstances
would ordinarily experience."3 57
B. The Exposure Requirement Issue
The narrower problem presented in this case was that, de-
spite the physical needle-prick injury, there was no proof of an
exposure to the HIV virus, or of an injury in the form of testing
positive for the virus. It has been argued that allowing recovery
in such a situation would result in an increase in falsified and
imagined claims based upon unforeseeable levels of emotional
harm, especially with respect to diseases like AIDS that have
long, latent incubation periods and can not be immediately de-
tected. The purpose of an actual exposure requirement in such
cases would be to further ensure that the emotional injury is
real, rather than trivial, temporary or imagined.
358
In the AIDS arena, courts have been inconsistent when
confronted with the question of an exposure requirement. 359 As
this Note discussed, one line of cases has required that a plain-
tiff demonstrate, at a minimum, an actual channel of exposure
to the virus.360 An extensive analysis and reasoning behind re-
quiring proof of exposure was given by the Idaho Court of Ap-
peals in Neal v. Neal.36 1
356. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 54, at 363-64 (giving examples of
some physical impacts that are questionable indicators of valid emotional
distress).
357. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1204.
358. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-81 (Mass. 1982).
359. See supra part II.D.
360. See supra part II.D.1.
361. 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). Although the decision was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Idaho, the reasoning behind this requirement is embel-
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In Neal, the court applied a two-part test for deciding
whether a rational, non-speculative basis existed for emotional
distress in a disease-phobia situation. 62 First, the court re-
quired a showing that the emotional injury was "sufficient." 63
It found that the plaintiff fulfilled this prong by satisfying the
common law "physical manifestation" test.364 However, it also
imposed an exposure requirement in order to guarantee that
the fear was "reasonable."365 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that even in circumstances where emotional injury is suffi-
ciently evidenced (in that case by the satisfaction of a physical
manifestation requirement), it would still be unreasonable if
proof of actual exposure was lacking. The court criticized cases
such as Castro and the district court decision in Marchica,
which permitted recovery for the fear of contracting AIDS ab-
sent proof of exposure.3 66 It concluded that such cases were
without merit because "a plaintiff's fear of a disease must be
based on more than the mere possibility of exposure to a disease
or disease-causing agent."3 67 The court concluded that decisions
like these could invariably lead to recovery in frivolous situa-
tions, such as where: (1) a plaintiff undergoes a general blood
transfusion and develops a fear of getting AIDS; (2) someone
coughs in a plaintiff's face who then develops a fear of getting
tuberculosis; or (3) a plaintiff ingests an unknown substance
and develops a fear of getting cancer.36 8 Ultimately, the appel-
late court decided (and the state supreme court affirmed) that
the additional exposure requirement was a necessary safeguard
against tenuous and unreasonable claims finding their way into
the courts.3 69
Although the position which Neal and other courts take is
premised on a desirable objective to limit recovery in unreason-
lished in greater detail by the appellate court. Compare id. at 886-89 with Neal v.
Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876 (Idaho 1994). See supra discussion accompanying notes
255-59.
362. Neal, 873 P.2d at 888.
363. Id. at 887.
364. Id. Note that the Idaho Supreme Court did not determine whether phys-
ical manifestation satisfied the "sufficiency" prong of the test. Id. at 876.
365. Id. at 887.
366. Id. at 888.
367. Id. at 889.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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able disease-phobia cases, it would be too strict a standard if
applied in an AIDS-phobia situation involving a needle-prick in-
jury. First, since the "physical impact" requirement has been
satisfied, the claim survives an initial judicial screening based
upon one of the traditional common law limitations that have
been recognized by the courts. Second, and more importantly,
the attention given to the disease in the media today, including
widespread information about how it is transmitted, further es-
tablishes the reasonableness of the emotional injury. Thus, the
Second Circuit in Marchica was justified in following the oppos-
ing line of cases, including Faya and Castro, that have rejected
this strict exposure requirement.370
If the plaintiff can instead allege a "specific incident of pos-
sible exposure" which created a reasonable fear of contracting
the disease, this should provide a sufficient basis for the jury to
determine whether or not that fear was reasonable. Decisions
like Neal, which insist on a strict exposure requirement, fail to
realize that certain case-specific factors in a "specific incident of
potential exposure" must still be considered in order to guaran-
tee that the resulting emotional distress is reasonable. For ex-
ample, a court should look at whether the identity of the
original needle user is unknown,371 whether the plaintiff had
knowledge (or a lack thereof) that contaminated hypodermic
needles are a major source of HIV transmission, and whether
the plaintiff was advised by medical specialists to receive thor-
ough HIV blood testing after being punctured.372 When viewed
370. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1205-06.
371. See Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, N.Y. L.J., March 26, 1992, at 3-4 (commenting on the distinction between
Hare and Castro with regard to the issue of a needle user's unknown identity).
Lipsig states:
Unlike Hare, the identity of the contaminator in Castro is unknown, making
the fear of contraction more reasonable .... Therefore, based upon the
reasonableness of the fear, the breach of the duty, evidence of a specific inci-
dent, and an actual physical injury, the facts in Castro arguably would sup-
port a claim even under the more narrow approaches taken by the lower
courts.
Id.
372. All of these factors were involved in Marchica's needle-prick incident,
and provided the jury with a sound basis to help guarantee the reasonableness of
his fear. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1206-07. The Second Circuit even stated that it
would be "unable to embrace the notion that a reasonable person, punctured by a
1995] 617
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in this manner, the concerns expressed by the Idaho Court of
Appeals in Neal are misplaced since the courts can look to sur-
rounding circumstances in order to determine whether the fear
of contracting a disease such as AIDS is reasonable. Conse-
quently, successful claims for frivolous emotional distress recov-
ery will not flood the courts, even though a strict exposure
requirement has been abandoned.
The Second Circuit also acknowledged one other important
limitation to a plaintiff's recovery. In a needle-prick situation
like this, factors may subsequently arise (such as finding out
that the needle was not contaminated, or receiving HIV-nega-
tive blood tests back after a certain time period) that could
make a plaintiff's formerly reasonable AIDS-phobia fear unrea-
sonable. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Faya v. Almarez
373
proposed an equitable standard when it stated that plaintiffs
"may only recover for their fear . . . which may have resulted
from [defendant's] negligence for the period constituting their
reasonable window of anxiety .... "374 This period in Faya, as
well as in any other needle prick situation, would end at a point
when the plaintiff receives his or her HIV negative test results
back after a reasonable period of time.375 Given current data
that demonstrates 95% of HIV infected individuals usually test
positive for the virus within six months, this six-month period
can be used as an effective gauge to determine the reasonable
window of anxiety. Such a point in time establishes with suffi-
cient medical certainty that the plaintiff has not been exposed
to the virus, and therefore will not contract it.
Although the Second Circuit affirmed the $55,000 award
for Marchica's future emotional distress in this case, it did so by
making a legitimate distinction between the continuing fear of
developing AIDS and the permanent emotional distress injuries
resulting from post-traumatic disorder and its accompanying
physical symptoms. 376 The circuit conceded that after a period
of three years and three negative blood tests, any continuing
discarded hypodermic needle with blood in it, in a location known to be frequented
by drug users,... would not fear developing AIDS." Id. at 1206.
373. 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993). See supra discussion accompanying notes
261-66.
374. Id. (emphasis added).
375. Id.
376. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1207-08.
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fear of developing AIDS was unreasonable as a matter of law.3 77
However, it concluded that the jury award for future damages
was no longer based on mere AIDS-phobia, but was rather com-
pensation for validly established, permanent injuries in connec-
tion with post-traumatic stress disorder.378 As long as a court
instructs the jury as to this distinction, an award for future
damages does not violate the principle set forth in Faya.
V. Conclusion
The court in Marchica properly concluded that a claim for
emotional injury, based on the fear of contracting AIDS from a
needle prick, was actionable under FELA despite the absence of
a proven channel of exposure to the HIV virus. As long as a
plaintiff has alleged a specific incident of possible exposure pur-
suant to a physical impact, a court can still verify the genuine-
ness and reasonableness of the emotional injury claim by
relying on the particular facts at hand and looking to the dis-
tinctive aspects of the disease. This Note agrees with the Sec-
ond Circuit's approach as it relates to FELA cases, and would
extend the application of this standard to non-FELA situations
as well. Thus, when an individual is stuck by a dirty, discarded
hypodermic needle, and that person is well-informed about the
AIDS crisis in society, a jury could find that the fear of develop-
ing the disease is very real and substantial. If the circum-
stances eventually demonstrate a point in time which would
render the fear unreasonable, recovery can be limited to the pe-
riod constituting a reasonable window of anxiety, rather than
denying a valid claim in its entirety.
Joseph Loparco
377. Id. at 1207.
378. Id. at 1207-08.
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